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examine the causes of suicide as interpreted by the U.S. Army and the preventive measures the U.S. Army is taking to address suicide within its ranks. It will then discuss the theory of suicide from a social-psychological prospective followed by a discussion of how the U.S. Army's Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model and a lack of professional military education in the noncommissioned officer ranks have led to the inadequacies of U.S. Army's small unit leadership in dealing with suicide prevention. The paper will conclude with a recommendation for how the U.S. Army can correct small unit leadership deficiencies, thus better preparing first line leaders on combating suicide. The cause of this increase is the center of much debate within the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, Congress, numerous media outlets and the American people.
Underlining this suicide epidemic is the stress twelve plus years of constant combat in
Iraq and Afghanistan has, and continues to cause service men and women. In other words, the war and its associated stressors have brought to the forefront challenges that are faced by all Soldiers, regardless of rank, age, or ethnicity that if continued to go unchecked will serve as the underlying reason suicide rates continue to increase.
This paper will examine the causes of suicide as interpreted by the U.S. Army and the preventive measures the U.S. Army is taking to address suicide within its ranks.
It will then discuss the theory of suicide from a social-psychological prospective as and Preventive Medicine, the stressor with the greatest impact on suicidal trends is relationship issues, which were present in more than 58% of suicides in 2009. 6 The second most prevalent risk factor is work stress, which contributed to 50% of the suicides from 2005 to 2009. 7 These two stressors combined; relationship and work related should be taken into account by U.S. Army Leaders in relation to deployments over the last 12+ years. Continued training cycles and repeated deployments greatly influence the stress Soldiers experience in both work and social support relationships such as family and friendships. Therefore, the repeated demand of deployment and the associated stressor becomes a burden on Soldiers that may contribute to suicide.
High risk behavior, such as illicit drug use and alcohol abuse, is a significant contributor to suicide within the U.S. Army. Suicides within the U.S. Army showed a:
History of substance abuse associated with suicide and attempted suicide was 28% and 24%. Known drug and alcohol use during suicide events included drugs (9%), alcohol (22%) and both (4%); unknown use of drugs (46%) and alcohol (36%). Known drug and alcohol use during suicide attempts involved drugs (63%), alcohol (30%) and both (21%). Starting in February 2009, the U.S. Army initiated a series of suicide "standdowns" consisting of three separate days in which interactive videos using behaviormodification technology were used to reinforce suicide prevention. The "stand-down" days are designed to allow commanders and community suicide prevention enablers to come together with Soldiers during a full day of dedicated suicide prevention training using the technics described in this section. Two stand-down days use two separate videos while the third stand-down day is an annual training requirement encompassing current suicide-prevention training material. The public response to this alarming and paradoxical trend largely has been to blame the usual suspects when bad things happen in our military: stress, the strain of intense operations and repetitive deployments, and the hardships of military life. Proposals to address the problem of suicide have also trod familiar ground: more money, more programs, more chaplains, expansion of mental health resources, more research on PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), new training modules, increased awareness, and better screening and treatment for those we think are at risk. Nevertheless, suicides continue to occur at unusually high rates in the military.
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Mastronianni and Scott "argue that our current understanding of this problem is incomplete, and that, as a nation, our approach to suicide in the military needs to be What constitutes this society is the existence of a certain number of beliefs and practices common to all the faithful, traditional and thus obligatory. The more numerous and strong these collective states of mind are, the stronger the integration of the religious community, and also the greater its preservative value….The essential thing is that they be capable of supporting a sufficiently intense collective life. 27 In relating Durkheim's theory of social-networks manifested in religious affiliation to the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army has become the integration and regulation organization for Soldiers much as 19th Century churches were for French citizens.
Therefore, the U.S. Army as an organization, along with its associated operating procedures and service cultural, has become the regulator and integrator of our Thwarted belongingness involves a sense on the part of the individual that he or she lacks meaningful connections to others and that previously solid relationships have become strained or lost….Perceived burdensomeness, involves a sense on the part of the individual that he or she is a burden to the world, someone who not only fails to make meaningful contributions but is also a liability. Taken together, the theory says, these two perceptions produce the desire for suicide. …the structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployments in support of the combatant commander and other Army requirements. The ARFORGEN process is the Army's core process for force generation, executed with supporting-to-supported relationships, that cycles units through three force pools: RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. 32 The ARFORGEN process is designed to support three levels of requirements which are:
steady-state, surge, and full surge which apply to combatant commander's war time requirements for ground forces. Encompassed in each are three distinct phases of readiness: RESET, train/ready, and available. Each phase is based on a set timeline depending on a unit's deployment. For example, when a deployed unit is redeploying and 51% of the unit has redeployed to home station, the unit enters the RESET phase. Army provided is being eliminated from their lives. For these Soldiers "… the need to belong is so powerful that, when satisfied, it can prevent suicide even when perceived burdensomeness and the acquired ability to enact lethal self-injury are in place. By the same token, when the need is thwarted, risk for suicide is increased." …taking care of our Soldiers was a primary responsibility of military leadership. We knew that the troops were our credentials, and we tried to create an environment where they could be the best they could possibly be. This meant getting to know them and their families -where they lived on or off post. This was part of our responsibilities for those under our command. It was -and still is -Leadership 101. 38 Therefore, the failure of leadership to take care of their Soldiers, know their Soldiers on duty work and off duty habit, their families, where they live, how they live, who they spend time with while not on duty etc… is very key to leading Soldiers. The problem is that our first line leaders are not involved in their Soldier's lives as much as they were 20 prior to 9/11. The central cause is the shift from a peace time Army to a war time Army that refocused our leadership emphasis from basic human leadership to supporting a war time leadership requirement. In other words, unit level leadership's focus became preparing, deploying and fighting the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which is different from leadership in peacetime garrison environment. This shift to war, coupled with U.S.
Army programs, such as the ARFORGEN process, required to support the War fundamentally changed the way the junior NCO leads his Soldiers.
Unit Level Leadership and its Role in Suicide Prevention
The NCO corps is the focus of on ground leadership within small units. An NCO's ability to influence National strategy through small unit effectiveness is without peer.
Therefore, the single most important aspect of an NCO's job is leadership, effective leadership that's primacy is the health and welfare of the Soldiers he is charged with leading. The old maxim of take care of your Soldiers and they will take care of the mission is, in the simplest terms, the means in which the U.S. Army accomplishes its mission. ADRP 6-2 Army Leadership, states that:
Soldiers look to their NCOs for solutions, guidance, and inspiration. Soldiers count on leaders they trust and admire….They expect them to convey information and provide day-to-day guidance to get the job done.
To answer the challenges of the operational environment, NCOs must train Soldiers to cope, prepare, and perform regardless of situation…. NCOs are accountable for caring for Soldiers and setting the example for them. 39 Bottom line is that it is the responsibility of the NCO to ensure the readiness of each With deployment schedules, training schedules and other management requirements that unit leadership has, barracks maintenance is a task that is best suited for the DPW. It allows Soldiers to focus on training, prepare for deployment and keep their focus on battle readiness… and assignment and termination of rooms…. 40 Although intended to relieve the burden of barracks operations during deployment, FSBI was quickly adopted and became standard operating procedure throughout the U.S.
Army. With garrisons now managing barracks, unit integrity was no longer maintained because garrison staffs were assigning Soldiers wherever barracks space was available, regardless of unit integrity. This lack of unit integrity and the abdication of unit leader responsibility to barracks, soon created a situation where leadership didn't seem to believe it was their responsibility to check on soldiers. The unintended consequence is that first line leaders began to disassociate themselves with the barracks. Prior to FSBI, unit leaders were expected to conduct routine inspections in order to maintain good order and discipline within the barracks to ensure the actual facilities were maintained in good and working condition. After implementation, leaders just stopped inspecting barracks which in turn caused the good order and discipline to deteriorate …a core NCO course that promotes skills related to garrison leadership, the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), has been significantly shortened. In its new form (as the Warrior Leader Course, or WLC), it is no longer primarily focused on basic leadership skills. The high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) necessitated that training of NCOs focus on combat related leadership skills that allow them to be effective in the war on terror. As combat, tactical, and technical skills were emphasized, the Army has unintentionally limited the focus on garrison and leadership requirements. Leadership skills necessary for success while deployed may be developed during current training activities, but given that leadership is contextual and effectiveness depends on the situation, those skills may not transfer to success within a garrison environment. 43 combat skills significantly redesigned its initial NCO educational course in order to provide a trained and ready force while sacrificing core leadership education. This deliberate and purposelessly driven redesign in junior NCO leadership education is, in essence, creating an unintentional side effect that is degrading the U.S. Army's first line of defense against suicide by insufficiently providing leadership training to our junior NCOs.
Conclusion
The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army is placing a great amount of emphasis, time, and resources against its war of suicide. Study after study has been executed in order to determine why soldiers are committing suicide; all of which are tied 27 to 12+ years of executing the War on Violent Extremism and its associated stressors on the Force. As a result of these studies the U.S. Army has developed publications, web pages, and training packages while conducting numerous "suicide stand down days" all designed to bring to the forefront the need to stop suicide. All of which, while providing increased awareness and assisting in preventing numerous suicides, still continues to fall short as the suicide rate continues to climb to historical rates. Until the U.S. Army corrects the deficiencies it continues to inflict on itself with regard to assisting junior leaders in both personal and professional development it will continue to be challenged in protecting our Nation's most precious national assets, the men and women who sacrifice themselves to protect and defend the United States.
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